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• The disclaimer of an interest in an item of income in
respect of decedent does not constitute a transfer and so
gain is not recognized on the exercise of a qualified
disclaimer.24
• If an installment obligation passes into an estate and in
turn is transferred to a beneficiary of the estate, the event is
not taxable unless the obligor is a beneficiary.25 In the event
the beneficiary is someone other than the obligor, the
income tax basis in the hands of the beneficiary is the
decedent's basis adjusted for installments received by the
estate prior to the distribution to the beneficiary.26
Disposition of an installment obligation to the obligor
triggers income in the estate to the extent the obligor
acquires the installment obligation .27
Keep in mind that disposition of installment obligations
entered into by the estate constitutes a taxable disposition.28
This is a particularly important rule for the sale of land that
has been valued under special use valuation.29 Section 1040
of the Internal Revenue Code operates to shield from
recognition the gain on transfer of special use land to a
qualified heir.30 But that section does not appear to shield
from recognition the gain on the distribution of an
installment obligation from the estate. The statutory
exception for installment obligations entered into by the
decedent and passed through the estate.31 does not appear to
apply to installment obligations entered into by an estate
inasmuch as the distribution from the estate does not
involve "transmission of installment obligations at death."32
• Transfers occurring by operation of law, such as
passage to a surviving joint tenant by right of survivorship
do not result in recognition of gain.33
Income tax deduction
A taxpayer reporting income in respect of decedent is
entitled to an income tax deduction for the federal estate tax
on the rights to receive income in respect of decedent that
are included in the decedent's gross estate.34 The deduction
is based on the highest federal estate tax rate payable by the
estate.35
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 6 Harl, Agricultural Law § 47.03 (1995);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 6.02[1] (1995). See
also Harl, "Income in Respect of Decedent," 1 Agric. L.
Dig. 109 (1990).
2 I.R.C. §§ 691(a), 1014(a).
3 E.g., Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 C.B. 173 (share rents
under nonmaterial participation lease taxable to
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4 E.g., Apkin v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 692 (1986) (Series E
bond interest taxed to surviving joint tenant (child) on
redemption).
5 Rev. Rul. 64-289, 1964-2 C.B. 173. See Davison v.
United States, 292 F.2d 937 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 939 (1961).
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8 Id.
9 Ltr. Rul. 9232006, April 17, 1992.
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11 See Apkin v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 692 (1986) (all interest,
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owner as beneficiary on redemption; no election had
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income). See also Ltr. Rul. 9024016, March 14, 1990
(interest included in income of co-owner in year bonds
redeemed, disposed of or reached maturity unless I.R.C.
§ 454(a) election made; for bonds co-owned by decedent
and joint owner, surviving joint owner may elect under
I.R.C. § 454(a)).
12 I.R.C. §§ 691(a)(4),453B(c).
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-5.
14 See Ltr. Rul. 9023012, March 6, 1990.
15 Estate of Peterson v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 630 (1980), aff'd,
667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981) (calves sold before death
were too light at death to meet contract specifications).
16 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 92-47, 1992-1 C.B. 198. See also
Ballard v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-217.
17 See n. 2 supra.
18 I.R.C. § 691(a)(2).
19 Id.
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-4.
21 Id.
22 See Sheldon v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 96 (1974).
23 Rev. Rul. 55-157, 1955-1 C.B. 293.
24 Ltr. Rul. 9319039, Feb. 12, 1993.
25 I.R.C. § 453B(c).
26 Id.
27 I.R.C, § 691(a)(4), (5).
28 See Rev. Rul. 55-159, 1955-1 C.B. 391.
29 See I.R.C. § 2032A.
30 I.R.C. § 1040(a).
31 I.R.C. § 453B(c).
32 Id.
33 See Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-2. See Apkin v. Comm’r, 86
T.C. 692 (1986).
34 I.R.C. §§ 691(c)(2)(A), 691(c)(2)(C).
35 I.R.C. § 691(c)(2)(C).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
POSSESSION. The dispute involved a farm lane which
ran between the parties’ rural properties. The land was used
by a tenant of both parties to farm their lands. The original
deed for the plaintiff’s portion identified the boundary by
two marker stones 72 perches (1188 feet) apart. The first
stone was found by surveyors but the second stone was
missing. The plaintiffs argued that because the distance
came to the lane, the center of the lane was the true
boundary. The defendants argued, and the court held, that
where a marker is missing, the distance measurement
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controls and that the lane could not be considered because
the lane was not mentioned in the deed. The plaintiffs also
argued that they had acquired title to the lane by adverse
possession. The court held that the plaintiffs’ possession
was not sufficiently adverse because it involved only
occasional recreational use; in addition, the tenant’s use of
the lane was permissive since the defendants also gave the
tenant permission to use the lane to farm both lands.
Barchowsky v. Silver Farms, 659 A.2d 347 (Md. Ct.
App. 1995).
ANIMALS
CATTLE. The plaintiff operated a trucking business
and was driving a truck on a public highway when the truck
struck several cattle on the highway. The plaintiff sued the
owner of the cattle in negligence and the trial court
submitted the issue on the basis of negligence by res ipsa
loquitur to the jury. The defendant argued that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was not available because an owner of
cattle in Nebraska owes only a duty of ordinary care not to
let the cattle escape onto a highway. The court held that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was available in all cases of
negligence, independent of the level of the duty of care
involved. The court held that the plaintiff had demonstrated
the first two elements of res ipsa loquitur in that (1) the
cattle escape would not have occurred in the normal course
of events, and (2) the fence containing the cattle was in the
exclusive control of the defendant. The third element, the
absence of an explanation for the escape was a jury question
based on whether the jury believed the explanation given by
the defendant. The court upheld the jury verdict for the
plaintiff. Roberts v. Weber & Sons, Co., 533 N.W.2d 664
(Neb. 1995).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
ENTIRETIES PROPERTY. The debtors, husband and
wife, held various property as tenants by the entirety and
claimed this property as exempt. The properties were
subject to secured and unsecured debts for which the debtors
were jointly liable. The debtors argued that the exemptions
were allowed as to the joint unsecured debts. The court held
that, under Pennsylvania law, property held as tenants by the
entirety was not exempt from all joint debts, secured and
unsecured; therefore, the property could not be claimed as
exempt in the bankruptcy case. In re Houck, 184 B.R. 21
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption for a residence. The debtor used the garage for an
electronics repair service which was the debtor’s sole source
of employment. The trustee objected that under Okla. Stat.
tit. 31, § 2, the homestead exemption was limited to $5,000
if the residence was used for both residential and business
purposes. The court held that the statute was clear and
unambiguous and limited the debtor’s exemption to $5,000.
In re Landry, 183 B.R. 899 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1995).
The debtors claimed their homestead as exempt and
sought to avoid a judicial lien which impaired the
exemption. The debtors did not file a homestead declaration
with the state. Without the homestead declaration, the
debtors’ exemption was allowed only against forced sales of
the homestead. The debtors claimed that the judicial lien
would impair their voluntary sale of the homestead. The
court held that the judicial lien could not be avoided since it
was not enforceable against the homestead in a voluntary
sale of the property. In re Amiri, 184 B.R. 60 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1995).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS. The debtor operated
a grain storage facility in Ohio. The debtor had entered into
delayed pricing contracts with several grain producers who
stored grain at the facility. The debtor failed to meet Ohio
statutory net worth requirements and its license was
suspended. Under Ohio law, grain producers have a
statutory lien for grain stored in a licensed facility which
continues until the producer receives compensation for the
grain. The debtor was allowed to continue in business to
liquidate the grain inventory and to disburse payments to the
producers. Some of these payments occurred within 90 days
before the debtor filed for bankruptcy and the bankruptcy
trustee sought to recover the payments as preferential
transfers. The trustee argued that the statutory lien was
voidable by the trustee under Section 545(1) because it
arose only when the facility became insolvent. The court
held that the Ohio statutory lien arose when the grain was
deposited in the facility. The trustee also argued that the lien
was voidable under Section 545(2). The court held that
Section 545(2) did not apply because no lien existed at the
time of the petition since the producers’ liens were
extinguished upon payment. Thus, the court held that the
producers were secured creditors and that the payments
received pre-petition were no more than the producers
would have received in the bankruptcy case and the
transfers were not avoidable. Merchants Grain, Inc. v.
Adkins, 184 B.R. 52 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
MODIFICATION OF PLAN. The debtors’ plan had
been confirmed and provided that all plan payments were to
be made through the trustee. The debtors sought to modify
the plan to provide for direct payments to some creditors
without payment of the trustee’s fee as allowed by In re
Wagner, 36 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1994), which was decided
after the plan was confirmed. The court held that
modification of a plan was limited to the three types of
modifications allowed by Section 1229(a), none of which
involved changing the manner in which plan payments were
to be made. The court noted that prior toWagner, debtors
could make plan payments directly to creditors but were
required to pay the trustee’s fees on such payments;
therefore, the debtors’ plan could have provided for direct
payments and Wagner then could have been applied to
remove the trustee’s fees. However, because the debtors’
plan provided for payments only through the trustee, the
plan could not be modified to allow direct payments. In re
Wruck, 183 B.R. 862 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1995).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
ELIGIBILITY. The debtor was president, director and
sole shareholder of a produce marketing corporation which
was licensed under PACA. The debtor’s schedules listed
debts of the corporation, primarily operating expenses and
debts for purchased produce, as possible claims against the
debtor in case the debtor was held liable for the
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corporation’s debt. The debtor argued that the claims were
contingent because the debtor’s liability would require a
judicial determination of liability. The court held that the
debts were not contingent because the debts did not depend
on any additional acts or time for the debts to be finally
determined as to amount. The court held that the debtor’s
disputation as to personal liability for the debts did not make
the claims contingent. Because the claims exceeded the
Chapter 13 eligibility requirement, the case was dismissed.
In re Nicholes, 184 B.R. 82 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 13
case which was dismissed. The debtor’s current Chapter 13
case was filed more than 3 years after income tax returns
were filed and more than 240 days after the taxes were
assessed. The Chapter 13 plan provided for 100 percent
payment of the tax claims as a priority claim. A creditor
objected to treatment of the taxes as a priority claim because
the claim did not qualify under Section 507(a)(7)(A). The
IRS argued that the previous Chapter 13 case tolled the
limitation periods of Section 507(a)(7)(A). The Bankruptcy
Court held that 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) did not apply to
bankruptcy statutory limitation periods; therefore, the
previous Chapter 13 case did not statutorily toll the Section
507(a)(7)(A) limitation periods. However, the court held
that it had the equitable power to allow the priority of such
claims. The court held that, as to the creditor, the equities
favored not allowing the claim to have priority and to be
treated as a general unsecured claim. The District Court
reversed, holding that the previous Chapter 13 case tolled
the period for determining priority status of tax claims. In re
Eysenbach, 183 B.R. 365 (W.D. N.Y. 1995), rev’g, 170
B.R. 57 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1994).
PARTNERSHIPS. The taxpayers were partners in a
partnership which filed for bankruptcy. The IRS had filed a
claim in the partnership case and the claim was included in
the plan payments. However, the plan was not completed
and the IRS assessed the taxes against the taxpayers as
general partners. The assessments were made more than 10
years after the taxes were originally due and the taxpayers
argued that the statute of limitations on the assessments had
expired. The court held that under I.R.C. § 6503(h), the
partnership's bankruptcy filing tolled the statute of
limitations on assessments until the automatic stay was
lifted in the partnership bankruptcy case. United States v.
Wright, 57 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1995), rev’g, 868 F. Supp.
1070 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
POST-PETITION CLAIMS. The debtors had filed for
Chapter 13 and their plan was confirmed. The debtors had
completed all payments under the plan when the IRS filed a
claim for post-petition taxes. The plan did not provide for
payment of post-petition claims but the debtors sought to
modify the plan to include the taxes. The court held that the
IRS would be granted relief from the automatic stay because
the plan did not provide for post-petition claims, the plan
could not be modified after all plan payments were made,
and the issue was better handled in the Tax Court. In re
DeBerry, 183 B.R. 716 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
adopted as final amendments to the regulations governing
the late planted agreement option to remove the wheat,
barley, oats, rye and flaxseed endorsements because the
endorsements are covered in the small grains crop insurance
provisions. 60 Fed. Reg. 40054 (Aug. 7, 1995).
HERBICIDES. The plaintiff was a potato farmer who
had applied manure and grass clipping on potato fields. The
potatoes were damaged by residue from a herbicide in the
clippings and manure and the plaintiff sued the herbicide
manufacturer for negligence in failing to warn about the
residue effects of the herbicide. The court held that the
action was pre-empted by FIFRA. The plaintiff argued that
the action was not pre-empted insofar as the failure to warn
included means other than warnings on labels. The court
rejected this argument as also included in the FIFRA pre-
emption because other types of warnings were a type of
labeling requirement. Goodwin v. Bacon, 896 P.2d 673
(Wash. 1995).
The plaintiffs grew various agricultural products which
they alleged were damaged by pesticides drifting from the
defendants’ wheat farms. The plaintiff also sued the
manufacturer of the pesticides for negligent failure to warn
about the danger to crops from drifting, negligent testing
and negligent marketing. The court held that these causes of
action were actually involved with the plaintiffs’ claim that
the defendant manufacturer was negligent in failing to warn
about drift and the actions were pre-empted by FIFRA. Hue
v. Farmboy Spray Co., 896 P.2d 682 (Wash. 1995).
The plaintiff was a grain farmer who had applied the
herbicide Scepter to the plaintiff’s bean fields in one year
and planted corn on the same fields in the following year.
The corn was alleged to have been damaged by carryover of
the herbicide. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer for
negligent misrepresentation that corn could be grown one
year later on fields treated with Scepter. The focus of this
action was on statements made by sales and promotional
materials and advertisements, not on label instructions. The
defendant argued that the action was a form of failure to
warn and was pre-empted by FIFRA. The court held that the
action was not pre-empted because it involved non-label
communication by the defendant. Gorton v. American
Cyanamid Co., 533 N.W.2d 746 (Wis. 1995).
The plaintiff was a city worker whose duties included
spraying weeds with a herbicide manufactured by the
defendant. The plaintiff sued in negligence, strict liability
and breach of implied warranty for personal injuries caused
by the herbicide. The defendant argued that the action was
pre-empted by FIFRA. The court held that the actions were
pre-empted by FIFRA because the plaintiff based the
actions on the defendant’s failure to provide adequate
warnings and instructions with the herbicide. Quest
Chemical Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1995),
rev’g, 884 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)..
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS-ALM § 10.03[3].* The
plaintiffs were a farming corporation and an individual who
performed custom farming for the corporation. The
plaintiffs were determined by the ASCS (now CFSA) to be
one “person” for purposes of the payment limitation
provisions. The ASCS ruled that the individual custom
farmer had provided financing to the farm clients because
the checks for payment for the services were often held for
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several months before cashing and the individual had agreed
in some cases to accept a portion of the crop in payment.
The court held that the ASCS determination was supported
by the evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The
plaintiffs also raised the issue of whether the ASCS was
estopped from changing the determination of separate
person status seven and eight years after the initial
determination. The court held that estoppel was not allowed
because the delays were caused primarily by the plaintiffs’
attempts to hide the true nature of the parties’ relationship.
The court also held that the ASCS did not make
impermissable use of the ASCS Handbook provisions
because the determination complied with the published
regulations. Logan Farms, Inc. v. Espy, 886 F. Supp. 781
(D. Kan. 1995).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff was a
resident of Los Angeles County who claimed injuries from
the spraying of malathion manufactured by the defendants
and sprayed on the plaintiff’s residential area as part of the
California Medfly eradication program. The program
provided for written notification of the sprayings but the
notifications by the state did not include the exposure
warnings on the malathion required by the EPA. The court
held that the manufacturers and applicators had no duty to
warn the public that the state warnings did not include the
label warnings. Macias v. State, 897 P.2d 530 (Cal. 1995),
rev’g, 28 Cal. Rptr.2d 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
WEEDS. The APHIS has issued interim regulations
redesignating areas of North and South Carolina under
quarantine for witchweed control. 60 Fed. Reg. 39835
(Aug. 4, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The taxpayers
established an irrevocable charitable lead trust which
provided an annuity for a charitable organization and a
remainder to the grantor’s children or their estates. The
grantors could not serve as trustees and were not officers or
directors of the charitable organization. The annuity was to
be paid first from trust income and then from principal with
any excess income added to principal. The IRS ruled that
the trust was eligible for a gift tax charitable deduction and
was not includible in the grantors’ gross estate. The IRS also
ruled that the trust property would not be subject to GSTT
because the property would not pass to any skip persons.
Ltr. Rul. 9533017, May 16, 1995; Ltr. Rul. 9534004, May
16, 1995.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent had
executed a will in 1965 and became incompetent prior to
October 22, 1986 and remained incompetent until the
decedent’s death. The will provided for estate property to
pass to five trusts, one for each of the decedent’s children.
Two of the children were incompetent and childless and,
within nine months after the decedent’s death, they
disclaimed their interests in the trusts, which passed under
the will to the other three trusts. The other three children
then disclaimed the property which passed to them under the
disclaimers such that the property passed to their children.
The IRS ruled that the disclaimers were timely and effective
if the disclaimers for the incompetent children were
enforceable under state law. The IRS also ruled that the
passing of the disclaimed property to the decedent’s
grandchildren was not subject to GSTT because the property
passed under a 1965 will and the decedent was incompetent
from before October 22, 1986 until death. Ltr. Rul.
9534006, May 19, 1995.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].*  The decedent had established an inter vivos trust
which contained all of the decedent’s property. The
decedent’s will provided that the decedent’s residuary estate
would pass under the terms of the trust. The trust provided
for creation of two trusts for each of the decedent’s two
children, a GSTT nonexempt trust and an exempt trust, with
the decedent’s GSTT exemption amount split between the
trusts. The remainders would pass to the step child of each
child. The decedent’s grandnephew and grand niece
challenged the will and the parties reached a settlement
which provided for some of the estate property to pass to the
grandnephew and grandniece. The estate tax return included
all of the information about the allocation of the GSTT
exemption but put the information concerning the two trusts
in the direct skip section. The IRS ruled that the return
substantially complied with the election requirements to
effectively make the GSTT exemption allocation. The IRS
also ruled that the property passing to the grandnephew and
grandniece was eligible for allocation of a part of the GSTT
exemption amount because the settlement was reached in a
bona fide dispute involving an enforceable right. Ltr. Rul.
9534001, May 1, 1995.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  The decedent became incompetent
prior to death and the decedent’s spouse was named
conservator. The conservator established an irrevocable trust
in the decedent’s name and transferred two life insurance
policies to a trust, both with approval of a state court. The
decedent died within three years of the transfer and the life
insurance policies were included in the decedent’s gross
estate. The IRS ruled that the transfer was subject to gift tax
and that the estate was allowed an  estate tax credit for gift
tax paid. Ltr. Rul. 9533001, Jan. 23, 1995.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will bequeathed all property to a son. The son
and the surviving spouse entered into an agreement to set
aside the probate of the will and distribute all of the property
to the spouse except for $600,000 which went to the son.
The estate claimed a marital deduction for the property
which passed to the spouse and stated that no disclaimer
was made. The estate argued that the agreement was a
disclaimer by the son or that the agreement was a settlement
of a bona fide will dispute, both giving rise to a marital
deduction for the property passing to the spouse. The court
held that the agreement was not a qualified disclaimer
because the agreement directed the passing of the property
to someone other than the persons, the son’s illegitimate
children, who would have received the property under the
statute. In addition, the agreement was not a settlement of a
dispute but a tax avoidance scheme because the spouse had
no right under the statute to the decedent’s estate. The
appellate court reversed, holding that, under the state
probate law, the disclaimed property would not have passed
to the illegitimate children because the son had not executed
a written notice of intent to recognize the children as the
son’s heirs.  DePaoli v. Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
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(CCH) ¶ 60,205 (10th Cir. 1995), rev’g, T.C. Memo.
1993-577.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[3]. * Under Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325,
as modified by Rev. Rul. 81-51, 1981-1 C.B. 458, the IRS
position was that where a grantor of a trust retained an
unrestricted power to remove a corporate trustee and
appoint a new corporate trustee, the grantor was considered
to have retained the trustee’s discretionary powers over
distributions. In light of Est. of Wall v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.
300 (1993) and Est. of Volk v. Comm’r, 973 F.2d 1409 (8th
Cir. 1992), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1991-503 , the IRS has
revoked Rev. Rul. 79-353  and ruled that where a grantor of
a trust retained an unrestricted power to remove a corporate
trustee and appoint a new unrelated or nonsubordinate
corporate trustee, the grantor was not considered to have
retained the trustee’s discretionary powers over
distributions. Rev. Rul. 95-58, I.R.B. 1995-36.
The decedent was a beneficiary of a marital trust
established by the decedent’s predeceased spouse which did
not give the decedent any power as trustee to distribute trust
corpus except by testamentary power of appointment. As
part of estate tax planning, the decedent and trust remainder
holders agreed to annual distributions from the trust. Several
such distributions were made before the decedent became
incompetent. Two annual distributions were made after the
decedent became incompetent. Although all the remainder
holders signed agreements to the annual distributions, no
signature was made for the decedent by a legal
representative for the last two distributions. The court held
that the pre-incompetency annual agreements were
enforceable under state law but that the post-incompetency
agreements were revocable; therefore, the trust corpus
distributed pre-incompetency were not included in the
decedent’s gross estate but that the post-incompetency
distributions were included in the decedent’s gross estate.
Estate of Halpern v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-352.
VALUATION.  The taxpayer transferred to a trust a
residential property which was used by the taxpayer as a
residence. The taxpayer allowed friends and relatives to use
the property without charge. The property included a lane,
tennis court, swimming pool and a house for which a
historic easement had been granted by the taxpayer. The
IRS ruled that the trust was a qualified personal residence
trust (QPRT) satisfying the requirements of Treas. Reg. §
25.2702-5(c). Ltr. Rul. 9533025, May 19, 1995.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALCOHOL FUELS CREDIT. The IRS has ruled that
where alcohol eligible for the fuels credit under I.R.C. §
40(b)(1)(A) is mixed with alcohol not eligible for the credit,
the amount of credit is reduced proportionally by the
amount of the ineligible alcohol in the mixture. Rev. Rul.
95-54, I.R.B. 1995-35.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayers were
a doctor and spouse who operated a horse breeding and
racing business. The court held that the business was not
operated for profit, thus limiting deductions to income,
because the taxpayers’ recordkeeping was insufficient to
evaluate the success of the business, the taxpayers did not
seek financial advice to make the business profitable and the
taxpayers had a history of losses from other cattle breeding
and real estate rental businesses. Meaney v. Comm’r, 95-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶  50,406 (11th Cir. 1995), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1994-94.
The taxpayer operated a horse breeding venture. The
court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to claim
deductions relating to the venture because the venture
lacked economic substance. The court noted that the
taxpayer was not experienced or knowledgeable about the
horse breeding business, paid inflated prices for the horses,
spent little time on the business and did not consult experts
on how to make the venture profitable. Hartford v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-351.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* The
taxpayers had sold some property on installment sale;
however, the taxpayers’ return preparer erroneously elected
not to report the gain on the installment method. The
taxpayers used a different return preparer the next year who
also prepared the return without using the installment
method. The taxpayers’ returns were then audited and the
new preparer noticed that the installment method was not
used on the installment sale of the property and the
taxpayers requested an extension of time to revoke the
election out of the installment method. The IRS ruled that
the revocation would not be allowed because the error was
not discovered until after an audit had begun. Ltr. Rul.
9533012, May 15, 1995.
INTEREST. The taxpayer purchased a residence and an
annuity contract. The residence purchase was financed in
part by a mortgage loan which was collateralized in part by
the annuity contract. The IRS ruled that the deductible
residential mortgage interest is decreased by the amount of
the loan collateralized by the annuity contract multiplied by
the interest rate on the loan. Rev. Rul. 95-53, I.R.B. 1995-
34.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period October 1, 1995 through December 31, 1995, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments is 8 percent and for
underpayments is 9 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations is 11 percent. Note:
the GATT legislation reduces the interest rate on
overpayments above $10,000 by 1.5 percentage points. Rev.
Rul. 95-59, I.R.B 1995-35.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. A general
partnership converted to a registered limited liability
company under New York law. The IRS ruled that the
RLLP would be taxed as a partnership because (1) the
RLLP lack continuity of life since a partner could dissolve
the partnership in certain circumstances without the consent
of the other partners; (2) the RLLP lacked centralized
management since under the RLLP law, all partners can act
as agents of the partnership in carrying out the normal
business of the RLLP; and (3) the RLLP lacked the
characteristic of free transferability of interests since no
interest in the partnership could be transferred with consent
of all of the other partners. Rev. Rul. 95-55, I.R.B. 1995-
35.
PAYMENT OF WAGES IN COMMODITIES. The
Social Security Administration has issued a ruling as to
when noncash transfers for agricultural labor are considered
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wages for under the Social Security Act so that the
treatment of such transfers is consistent with IRS treatment
of the transfers. The ruling generally adopts the IRS position
stated in Rev. Rul. 79-207, 1979-2 C.B. 351. Note: the IRS
has issued additional guidelines. See Harl, “Guidelines On
Payment Of Wages In Kind,” 6 Agric. Dig. 26 (1995).
Social Security Ruling 95-3p, 60 Fed. Reg. 40221 (Aug. 7,
1995).
RETURNS. The IRS has issued temporary regulations
providing that the IRS may require a return preparer to use a
method of signing returns other than pen-to-paper or a
facsimile signature stamp. 60 Fed. Reg. 37585 (July 21,
1995).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
INADVERTENT TERMINATIONS. An S corporation
shareholder transferred stock to a grantor trust which was an
eligible S corporation shareholder. When the shareholder
died, the trust passed to a remainder holder who failed to
make the QSST election. When the second trust beneficiary
died, the stock passed in trust to several children who also
failed to make the QSST election. When the omissions were
discovered the beneficiaries made the election. The
corporation and shareholders had made returns consistent
with S corporation status. The IRS ruled that the termination
of S corporation status was inadvertent and allowed the
corporation to retain its S corporation status through the
period involved.  Ltr. Rul. 9533006, May 3, 1995.
TRUSTS. The taxpayers transferred appreciated rental
property to a foreign corporation in exchange for annuities.
The court held that the taxpayers remained liable for the tax
on the rental income because no title was transferred to the
corporation, the taxpayers retained the benefits and burdens
of the property ownership, and the taxpayers retained the
rental income. Spearbeck v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
357.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE-ALM §
13.01[4][a].* The debtors were farmers who had granted
security interests in their farm products to the plaintiff bank.
Because Kansas did not have a certified central filing
system for purposes of the federal farm products statute, 7
U.S.C. 1631, the bank had sent several annual written
notices of its security interest to the defendant agricultural
cooperative. The cooperative had also extended credit to the
debtors and had purchased farm products from the debtors,
either by crediting the purchases against the debtors’
account or by issuing checks. After the debtors filed for
bankruptcy, the bank sued the cooperative for conversion in
failing to make payments for the farm products by checks
made out jointly to the bank and the debtors. The
cooperative argued that the written notices of the security
interest were ineffective because they did not strictly
comply with the requirements of the statute. The notices
identified the debtors, their address, the existence of the
security interest in farm products and a listing of the farm
products as grain or beans. The statute also required
identification of the land on which the crop was grown,
identification of the county in which the crops were grown
and the specific type of grain. The cooperative argued that
the statute did not provide for any substantial compliance
standard; therefore, the omission of any item made the
notices ineffective. The court noted that the statute did not
provide any provision for failure to comply completely with
the notice requirements and compared the written notice
requirements to the requirements under a certified central
filing system which do not require strict compliance with
the filing requirements. The court held that the bank had
substantially complied with the notice requirements
sufficient to put the cooperative on notice of the security
interest for purposes of the federal farm products rule. First
Nat’l Bank v. Miami County Co-op., 897 P.2d 144 (Kan.
1995).
WAIVER . The plaintiff was a bank which loaned
operating funds to a cattle farmer who fed cattle for the
defendant under “buy-back” agreements. Under the
agreements, the defendant sold cattle to the farmer who fed
the cattle and then resold the cattle back to the defendant for
a set price less the original price of the cattle. The farmer
had granted the bank a security interest in all farm property,
including after-acquired property. The bank brought an
action for conversion against the defendant for issuing a
check to the farmer alone for some cattle and the farmer
failed to pay the proceeds on the loan secured by the cattle.
The defendant argued that the bank had waived its security
interest by not requiring written consent for the sale of cattle
by the farmer over several years. The court held that the
defendant could not claim waiver of the security interest by
the bank because the security agreement required written
consent for any waiver and the defendant had constructive
notice of the recorded security interest and did not check the
public records. The courts holding also appears to be based
on the defendant’s failure to rebut the bank’s evidence that
it never allowed the farmer to sell collateral for checks
issued in the farmer’s name alone. First Bank v. Eastern
Livestock Co., 886 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE. The plaintiff owned 72 acres
of undeveloped land as trustee of a land trust. The trust
originally intended to develop residential condominiums on
the property and obtained a zoning change to allow the
development. The project became infeasible and the
plaintiff planted ornamental trees on the property for free
use by a landscaping business also owned by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff appealed the denial of an agricultural use
classification. The defendant county appraiser argued that
the initial price of the land, the rezoning request and lack of
profitability of the trees were sufficient to deny agricultural
use classification. The court held that the initial price as
development land and the rezoning were no longer relevant
to the current use of the land for an agricultural purpose.
The court also held that a profit is not required if the land is
used for a bona fide agricultural purpose. Although the trust
did not realize any profit from the growing of the trees, the
other business owned by the trustee used the trees to their
profit, creating a bona fide agricultural use of the trust land.
Wilkinson v. Kirby, 654 S.2d 194 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
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WE HAVE MOVED
I have succumbed to the lure of the ocean beaches, mountains, and mild winters and summers of the
Pacific Northwest and moved the Agricultural Law Press to Eugene, Oregon. Our new address is P.O.
Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405. Our new phone/fax number is 503-302-1958.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and other
professionals who advise agricultural clients. The book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep the
Manual current with the latest developments. After the first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100 per year
or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box  50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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